MEASURE AND CONTINUITY IN ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS V 3 (AND NEIGHBOURHOODS) by Panza, Marco
HAL Id: halshs-02377001
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02377001
Submitted on 22 Nov 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
MEASURE AND CONTINUITY IN ARISTOTLE’S
PHYSICS V 3 (AND NEIGHBOURHOODS)
Marco Panza
To cite this version:
Marco Panza. MEASURE AND CONTINUITY IN ARISTOTLE’S PHYSICS V 3 (AND NEIGH-
BOURHOODS). To Metron. Sur la notion de mesure dans la philosophie d’Aristote. Textes réunis
par Giovanna Giardina, Vrin, Ousia, Paris-Bruxelles, In press. ￿halshs-02377001￿
	   1 
MEASURE AND CONTINUITY IN ARISTOTLE’S PHYSICS V 3 
(AND NEIGHBOURHOODS) 
 
MARCO PANZA1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
All in all, measure enters, as such, in Aristotle’s Physics in no more than in seven different 
occasions. 
Two of them are the object of other papers in the present volume: they respectively 
concern Aristotle’s treatment of time, in IV 10-14, and his argument to prove that a motion 
cannot but cover a finite space in a finite time and an infinite space (if any) in an infinite time, 
in VI, 7. Two of the remaining five occasions are strictly connected with this same topic: the 
first pertains to an argument advanced in VI, 3, apparently for the same purpose, while 
proving that any continuum is infinitely divisible; the second pertains to an argument 
advanced in VI, 10, in order to prove that “no point [and] no other indivisible admits being set 
in motion [οὔτε στιγµὴν οὔτ’ ἄλλο ἀδιαίρετον οὐθὲν ἐνδέχεται κινεῖσθαι—241a7]”. 
The three further occasions are these: 
In V, 3, 226b32-34, Aristotle argues that 
 
Contrary concerning place <is that which is> the most distant in straight line, since the <straight 
line> is the minimum to be limited and that <which is> limited <is> measure [ἐναντίον δὲ κατὰ 
τόπον τὸ κατ' εὐθεῖαν ἀπέχον πλεῖστον· ἡ γὰρ ἐλαχίστη πεπέρανται, µέτρον δὲ τὸ πεπερασµένον]. 
 
In VIII, 9, 265b8-11, he advances that 
 
since the circular locomotion is measure of motions, it is necessary that it be the first (for all things 
are measured by the first), and because <it is> the first, <it> is measure of the other 
<mouvements> [γὰρ ὅτι µέτρον τῶν κινήσεων ἡ περιφορά, πρώτην ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὴν εἶναι 
(ἅπαντα γὰρ µετρεῖται τῷ πρώτῳ), καὶ διότι πρώτη, µέτρον ἐστὶν τῶν ἄλλων].  
 
In VIII, 10, 266b21-24, he envisages the possibility of taking 
 
in <a> finite magnitude same force, the same in kind as that in an infinite magnitude, that <be> as 
<a> measure of the finite force in the infinite <magnitude> [ληψόµεθα […] τινα δύναµιν τὴν 
αὐτὴν τῷ γένει τῇ ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ µεγέθει, ἐν πεπερασµένῳ µεγέθει οὖσαν, ἣ καταµετρήσει2 τὴν ἐν 
τῷ ἀπείρῳ πεπερασµένην δύναµιν].  
 
In none of these three occasions, is measure the main object of Aristotle’s attention. Far 
from that: in all three of these occasions, the appeal to measure plays a quite marginal role. In 
V 3, the focus is on the relation of being “intermediate [µεταξύ]”. In VIII, 9, the focus is on 
the claim that the first motion is a circular locomotion, which is, in turn, a lemma for the main 
claim that the first motion is the circular locomotion of the first heaven. In VIII, 10, the focus 
                                                
1 I thank Sylvain Delcomimnette and Giovanna Giardina, who have read and advantageously commented on 
a preliminary version of this paper. Thanks also to Lambros Couloubaritsis, who stimulatingly discussed my talk 
at the Catania’s conference, and to all the audience of this conference, as well as to Chiara Martini and Ken Saito 
for useful suggestions, and Alena Voss for her linguistic revision.  
2 For the translation of the verb ‘καταµετρέω’, see footnote (5) below. 
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is on the claim that the first mover has no extension, and the appeal to measure only helps to 
argue that (266a24-26) 
 
by what has been said, it is clear that there is no way for an infinite force to be in a finite 
magnitude [ὅλως οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐν πεπερασµένῳ µεγέθει ἄπειρον εἶναι δύναµιν, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον].  
 
In the other four occasions, in particular in IV 10-14, the appeal to measure is perhaps not 
so marginal. Still, there is no doubt that, also in these chapters, the focus of Aristotle’s 
attention is not measure, but time and motion. It seems, then, that Aristotle does not consider 
measure as a relevant subject to be specifically discussed in his Physics. 
This marginalisation of measure might surprise us at first glance. Still, in examining the 
other works devoted to physics, metaphysics and logic in Aristotle’s corpus, we are brought 
to a similar conclusion: though the appeal to measure and/or (in)commensurability is quite 
frequent, Aristotle seems to take these notions as being so well-known to be used, often by 
analogy, to clarify other notions or points. The case of the incommensurability of the diagonal 
and the side of a square is emblematic of this attitude. Aristotle makes a myriad of references 
to it, as a very well-known fact, in order to elucidate, by analogy, other facts or conceptions. 
However, the point is never discussed as such, whether in its mathematical content, or in 
connexion to the choice of appropriate notions to be used to account for the physical world. 
The only apparent exception comes from Metaphysics I, 1, where Aristotle seems to say 
something just about measure, rather than appealing to measure while dealing with other 
matters. He says, for example, that (1052b20) 
 
measure […] is that by which quantity comes to be known [µέτρον […] ἐστιν ᾧ τὸ ποσὸν 
γιγνώσκεται],  
 
and that 1052b24-27) 
 
also in the other <genera>, measure is said that by which, firstly, each <thing> comes to be known, 
and the measure of each <thing is> one, in length, in breadth, in depth, in weight, in speed [καὶ ἐν 
τοῖς ἄλλοις λέγεται µέτρον τε ᾧ ἕκαστον πρώτῳ γιγνώσκεται, καὶ τὸ µέτρον ἑκάστου ἕν, ἐν µήκει, 
ἐν πλάτει, ἐν βάθει, ἐν βάρει, ἐν τάχει].  
 
More importantly for my present purpose, he says that (1053a24-27) 
 
the measure <is> always homogenous: a magnitude, indeed, of magnitudes, and wherever you find 
length of length, breadth of breadth, sound of sound, weight of weight, unit of units [ἀεὶ δὲ 
συγγενὲς τὸ µέτρον· µεγεθῶν µὲν γὰρ µέγεθος, καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον µήκους µῆκος, πλάτους πλάτος, 
φωνῆς φωνή, βάρους βάρος, µονάδων µονάς ],  
 
and that (1053a14-15) 
 
not always <there is only> one measure for a number [οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ τῷ ἀριθµῷ ἓν τὸ µέτρον],  
 
and even (1053a17-18)  
 
the diagonal is measured by two <measures>, and <so> the side, and all magnitudes [ἡ διάµετρος 
δυσὶ µετρεῖται καὶ ἡ πλευρά, καὶ τὰ µεγέθη πάντα ]. 
 
(I shall return later in § 2 to this claim, which at first glance could appear quite strange) 
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However, in the context of Aristotle’s argumentation, which is essentially devoted to the 
notion of one, these considerations seem, anew, more as recalls of well-known conceptions, 
than as original claims. It even seems that Aristotle does not consider it important, or 
sufficiently useful, to tidily come back to these matters and offer his original insight. What 
measure is, and how it enters physics and mathematics is, for him, a given, to the extent that 
appealing to it can help in explaining other things, without needing further clarification or 
insight. 
As surprising as it might appear prima facie, it is not so much after a little reflexion. 
Whatever role measure could have played in Aristotle’s time in physics and mathematics, was 
depending on the content of the available mathematical theories, which is something Aristotle 
had less to say on, or even about which he never tried to say something. His attitude toward 
mathematics was always unequivocal: he certainly tried (without much success, by the way, 
as shown by the quite ambiguous claims of Metaphysics M 1-3) to understand its epistemic 
nature by so continuing, in a quite different direction, a reflexion already initiated by Plato, 
but he always took it as a datum, as an established portion of knowledge that is not to be 
contradicted. He never tried to improve or clarify it. What he says about measure seems to 
confirm this attitude. To clarify this point, a short survey of the mathematical conceptions of 
measure at his time, and of the way they differ from our present ones, is in order.  
 
 
2. What is Measure ? A Short Comparison of Our and Ancient Greek Views  
 
Among others, one basic feature of measure, which Aristotle passively accepts from 
mathematics, without any sort of discussion and any effort towards clarification, already 
emerges quite clearly from the previous quotes: measure pertains to a relation between 
homogenous relata. 
This conception will appear quite clearly at work, some decades later, in Euclid’s Elements 
(especially in books VII-X, but also in the first two definitions of book V: see below), and 
will remain at work in the whole corpus of ancient and early-modern mathematics. Making 
this clear, and underlining the difference between this conception and our modern one, is 
crucial for understanding both Aristotle’s claims on this matter and the evolution of 
mathematics. 
There are two basic aspects of this conception that it is convenient to distinguish: the first 
is that measure pertains to a relation, more precisely to a binary relation; the second is that 
this is a relation between homogenous relata. Distinguishing these points is all the more 
important being that modern mathematics basically agrees on the former, but disagrees on the 
latter. 
For a modern mathematician, measuring a magnitude is the same as associating it with a 
number—typically, but not only, with a real number. This is to say that measuring a 
magnitude is the same as reflecting its rank within a hierarchy of comparable magnitudes into 
an appropriate numerical order. This reflexion is essential, not only to assign a place to such a 
magnitude within the relevant hierarchy, but also since, overall, it allows transposing 
different, possibly imprecisely established hierarchies, into a fixed and well-established linear 
numerical order—or even, when real numbers are at issue, into a complete ordered field (in 
the mathematical sense of this term). Among other things, this makes possible to operate on 
numerical alias of the relevant magnitudes according to the usual additive and multiplicative 
rules. 
Strictly speaking, when we say that a flat is bigger than another, what we mean is not just 
that, but rather that the area of the former is greater than that of the latter. Analogously, when 
we say that a car goes faster than another, we mean that the speed of the former is greater than 
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that of the latter. Distinguishing between the order of flats, with respect to their extension, and 
that of their areas, or between the order of cars, with respect to their rapidity, and that of their 
speeds, is all but a subtlety. Since areas and speeds are numbers, in our language, or they are, 
at least, expressed by numbers, and the order of numbers is unique and well fixed, once for 
all, while the order of flats, with respect to their extension, and that of cars, with respect to 
their rapidity, are not only different to each other, but also quite difficult to establish in 
themselves. How can we compare, for example, relative to their extension, a flat on three 
floors with two mezzanine bedrooms with another, all on the same level ? How can we 
compare, relative to their rapidity, a jeep that is going down from a mule track, with a city car 
going through downtown ? To do it, we transpose each flat, or better its extension, or each 
car, or better its rapidity, into an appropriate numerical domain, and we compare the numbers 
that, through this transposition, we associate with the two flats and the two cars. 
When modern mathematicians speak of measure, they are referring to a transposition like 
these. 
In a (not very rigorous) sense, measures are just numbers, namely numbers associated with 
items with respect to a certain property of such items, so as to reflect their rank within the 
relevant hierarchy of comparable items, i.e., to flats with respect to their extension, or to cars, 
with respect to their rapidity. In this sense, we can say that both the area of a flat and the 
speed of a car are numbers, and they are so just insofar as they are measures of them, with 
respect to the flat’s extension or the car’s rapidity. Although, we could also say that what 
these numbers are measures of, are not properly flats (with respect to their extension), or cars 
(with respect to their rapidity), but just extension and rapidity themselves. Measures would, 
then, be numbers associated with properties of items, rather than with the items themselves. 
Insofar as we take measures to be measures of magnitudes, in conformity with the first 
parlance, flats and cars are magnitudes when taken with respect to their extension and 
rapidity, while, in conformity with the second parlance, the magnitudes are extension and 
rapidity themselves. 
Still, for a flat—or its extension—to be associated with a unique number reflecting its rank 
within the hierarchy of flats, with respect to their extension—or of flats’ extensions—, an 
appropriate unit is to be fixed, usually referred to as ‘unit of measurement’. The same for a 
car—or its rapidity—to be associated with a unique number reflecting its rank within the 
hierarchy of cars, with respect to their rapidity—or of cars’ rapidity. If such a unit changes, 
the numbers does as well. In another (more rigorous) sense, the measure of a flat, with respect 
to its extension—or of this very extension—or that of a car, with respect to its rapidity—or of 
this very rapidity—is not such a changing number, but rather something that remains constant 
under the change of the relevant unit of measurement; this is what we refer to by speaking of 
measure—and what we also call ‘area’ (of the relevant flat), or ‘speed’ (of the relevant car). 
This is not properly a number in itself, but it is expressed by numbers, a different one for any 
choice of the unit of measurement. Measuring a magnitude is, still, associating it with a 
number, but the measure of this magnitude is not properly this number, but rather what this 
numbers expresses and remains invariant when this number changes as a result of the change 
of the unit of measurement. 
Finally, in a third sense (even more rigorous than the second), what we refer to when 
speaking of measure, is neither a number nor what it expresses, but rather the very relation 
between the relevant magnitudes and the relevant numbers or that which numbers express, or, 
even better, the function associating these magnitudes with these numbers or what they 
express. If we take this function to associate magnitudes with numbers, then we have to either 
admit that any choice of a unit of measurement corresponds to a different one-argument 
function, and, therefore, to a different measure, or to take this function as having two 
arguments—one for magnitudes and the other for units of measurement—, so as to associate 
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with a number both a magnitude and a unit of measurement, rather than only a magnitude, or 
only a magnitude, but via a unit of measurement, rather than directly. If we take the relevant 
function to associate magnitudes with the invariant entity that numbers express, then a unique 
one-argument function would be at issue for each sort of magnitudes. We could then consider, 
that to each distinct sort of magnitudes corresponds a different (unique, one-argument) 
function, namely a different measure, and say, for instance, that areas and speeds are two 
distinct measures, insofar as they are two distinct functions, respectively pertaining either to 
extended and moving bodies, or to their extension and rapidity. However, we could also 
consider that measure is unique, that is, that there is a unique function, generally called 
‘measure’, whose values are associated with distinct sorts of magnitudes in different 
appropriate ways, and are, of course, invariant under the change of the unit of measurement, 
though being expressed by distinct numbers for its different choices. 
Though quite distinct from each other, these different senses in which we could today 
speak of measure recover a unique idea: that of conceiving measure as that which is at issue 
(in a form or another) when non-numerical items, or some of their properties—often called 
‘intensive’—are associated with numbers, so as to make the order of numbers reflect non-
numerical hierarchies, and to provide an indirect way to add and multiply these items to and 
with each other. What makes these senses different is the possibility of using an imprecise 
language, as our natural one, to describe different aspects of this basic idea in different ways. 
Still, however these aspects might be described, one important point remains clear: numbers 
are not objects of measurement; in none of the foregoing senses, numbers have measures or 
allow measure, understood as a function defined on them. 
Things went in quite a different way for Greek mathematicians. According to them, both 
magnitudes and numbers had measures. These were understood as different sorts of 
quantities, continuous and discontinuous, respectively. A number was, for Greek 
mathematicians, “a multitude composed of unities [ἀριθµὸς δὲ τὸ ἐκ µονάδων συγκείµενον 
πλῆθος—Euclid, Elements, def. VII.13]”—that is, in our language, a natural number greater 
than one. Its being taken as a discontinuous quantity depended just on its being a multitude, 
namely on its intrinsically being a compound of distinct elements. A magnitude was, instead, 
taken to be continuous, just insofar as it was taken to be, intrinsically, a single unitary item, 
rather than a compound. 
I shall come back in §§ 6 and 7 to the conception of continuity giving sense to such an 
idea, or, at least, on the way Aristotle presents it in his Physics, in particular in V 3. For the 
time being, only two remarks are in order. 
The first is that the Greek notion of a magnitude was not at all incompatible with the idea 
that magnitudes could be items, as distinct from intensive properties of them4. 
The second is that conceiving a magnitude (understood as an item) as a continuous 
quantity did not forbid Greek mathematicians to consider some parts of it, even if (in 
conformity with the conception of continuity which I shall describe in §§ 6 and 7) identifying 
                                                
3 Quotes and references to Euclid’s Elements are relative to Heiberg’s critical edition: Euclidis Elementa, 
edidit et latine interpretatus est I. L. Heiberg, Lipsiae, in ædibus B. G. Teubneri, 1883-85 (4 vols.). English 
translations are Heath’s, with some slight amendments from time to time: The Thirteen Books of Euclid’s 
Elements, Translated from the text of Heiberg, with Introduction and Commentary by T. L. Heath, Second ed. 
Revised with Additions, Cambridge 1925 (3 vols.). 
4 This is made clear, among other things, by the way the theory of proportions presented in book V.of the 
Elements (on which I’ll shall return pretty soon), explicitly concerned with magnitudes, is applied to geometrical 
items in book VI. What made Greeks mathematicians open to the idea that magnitudes could be items (as 
distinct from intensive properties of them), could not be considered here. It will be enough to say that, for them, 
differently than from us, there was, in fact, no categorical opposition between such a property and the items 
having it: a length was, for them, for example, if not identical with, at least primarily represented by a segment, 
in such a way that dealing with the former was just the same as dealing with the latter. 
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these parts as such breaks the magnitude’s continuity. Since identifying these parts did not 
prevent one from considering the magnitude as a single item in regard to its being so 
intrinsically, before these parts are identified in it. 
This is important since it explains how the essential difference in nature among magnitudes 
and numbers, due to their respectively being continuous and discontinuous magnitudes, did 
result, for Greek mathematicians, in no difference concerning their having measures, despite 
the fact that they intended a measure of a quantity as an aliquot part of it. 
More precisely, for them, a measure of a magnitude was another magnitude homogenous 
to the former, entering this magnitude an exact number of times; a measure of a composite 
number was, analogously, another number, divisor of the former, while a measure of a prime 
number was the unity, or better, one of its unities. The measure of a quantity was, therefore, 
another quantity, homogeneous to the former: an aliquot part of it, as I have just said. 
This conception is perfectly alien to any idea of reflection of the rank of an item within a 
given hierarchy into a fixed order. It rather makes the notion of measure strictly connected to 
that of part, as Aristotle himself makes clear in Metaphysics Z 10, 1034b32-33: 
 
Part is said in several ways; <in> one of these ways <a part is> that which measures according to 
the quantity [ἢ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ µέρος, ὧν εἷς µὲν τρόπος τὸ µετροῦν κατὰ τὸ ποσόν.  
 
This quote does not only make the connection of the notions of measure and part explicit. 
It also suggests that Aristotle was conceiving the former notion as epistemically prior to the 
latter, as apt to be appealed to in order to elucidate it (rather than vice versa). This is the same 
posture as Euclid’s. Though in the Elements, measure is never defined, it is appealed to in 
order to define: 
 
– parts and multiples of a magnitude, in defs. V.1-2: 
 
A magnitude is part of a magnitude, the less of the greater, when it measures out the greater 
[Μέρος ἐστὶ µέγεθος µεγέθους τὸ ἔλασσον τοῦ µείζονος, ὅταν καταµετρῇ5 τὸ µεῖζον], and 
                                                
5 This definition V.1 and the other definitions V.2 and VII.3-5 (mentioned below) apart, the verb 
‘καταµετρέω’ occurs very seldom in the Elements: in the πρότασις and the ἔκθεσις of proposition VII.1; in the 
πρότασις, ἔκθεσις and ἀπόδειξις of proposition X.2; and in the only ἀπόδειξις of proposition X.3. Propositions 
VII.1 and X.2 are akin, insofar as they both set forth the procedure of ἀνταναίρεσις: in modern terms, two 
different quantities (either two numbers or two magnitudes) α and β (β<α) being give, find the natural positive 
number m such that α=mβ+γ (0≤γ<β), then the positive natural number n such that β=nγ+δ (0≤δ<γ), and so on 
either indefinitely, or up reaching a null remainder. Proposition X.3 sets forth the procedure to find the 
maximum common aliquot part (or measure) of two commensurable magnitudes. In all these cases, as well in 
definitions V.1-2 and VII.3-5, Euclid seems to judge important to emphasize that the relevant whole is 
completely exhausted when all the relevant parts are added to each other, which means that these parts are 
aliquot ones. This is, at least, what, Acerbi implicitly suggests, by rendering, in his Italian translation of the 
Elements, ‘καταµετρέω’ with ‘misurare completamente’ (Euclide, Tutte le opere, a cura di F. Acerbi, Milano, 
2007, pp. 975, 1091, 1233, 1235). Still, Euclid also invariably uses the verb ‘µετρέω’ and its cognates to bring 
up the fact that a certain quantity is an aliquot part of another, that is, in the same sense as it seems to use the 
verb ‘καταµετρέω’. Possibly, he was conceiving ‘καταµετρέω’ as a clearer or more stringent version of 
‘µετρέω’, to be used, in some crucial occasions, to emphasize that the parts in question are aliquot ones, by 
allowing himself to use, then, once this had been made explicit, the more ambiguous verb µετρέω, in the same 
sense as καταµετρέω (as, for example, already in definitions VII.8-15 and X.1-2, and in other occurrences in the 
ἀπόδειξις of propositions X.2-3). The two verbs seem, then, to be used by Euclid in the same sense, but with a 
different emphasis. In my translation of Euclid’s definitions, I try to render this slight difference by translating 
καταµετρέω with ‘measure out’ and µετρέω and cognates with ‘measure’ and cognates. I’m far from sure that an 
akin difference of use of the two verbs should also be attributed to Aristotle. To verify it a much more detailed 
study than what I’m able to make here would be required. This is why, in my quotes from Aritstotle’s treatises, I 
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multiple, the greater of the less, when it is measure out by the less [Πολλαπλάσιον δὲ τὸ µεῖζον 
τοῦ ἐλάττονος, ὅταν καταµετρῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐλάττονος];  
 
– numbers that are part and parts of another number, in defs. VII.3-4: 
 
A number is part of a number, the less of the greater, when it measures out the greater [Μέρος 
ἐστὶν ἀριθµὸς ἀριθµοῦ ὁ ἐλάσσων τοῦ µείζονος, ὅταν καταµετρῇ τὸν µείζονα], and parts when it 
does not measure it out [Μέρη δέ, ὅταν µὴ καταµετρῇ];  
 
– multiples of a numbers, in def. VII.5: 
 
<A number is> multiple, the greater of the less, when it is measured out by the less 
[Πολλαπλάσιος δὲ ὁ µείζων τοῦ ἐλάσσονος, ὅταν καταµετρῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος];  
 
– even-times even and even-times odd numbers, in def. VII.8-9: 
 
an even-time even number is that <which is> measured by an even number according to an even 
number [Ἀρτιάκις ἄρτιος ἀριθµός ἐστιν ὁ ὑπὸ ἀρτίου ἀριθµοῦ µετρούµενος κατὰ ἄρτιον ἀριθµόν], 
and even-time odd is that <which is> measured by an even number according to an odd number 
[Ἀρτιάκις δὲ περισσός ἐστιν ὁ ὑπὸ ἀρτίου ἀριθµοῦ µετρούµενος κατὰ περισσὸν ἀριθµόν];  
 
– odd-times even and odd-times odd numbers, in def. VII.10*-116: 
 
and odd-times even is that <which is> measured by an odd number according to an even number 
[Περισσάκις ἄρτιός ἐστιν ὁ ὑπὸ περισσοῦ ἀριθµοῦ µετρούµενος κατὰ ἄρτιον ἀριθµόν], and odd-
times odd is that <which is> measured by an odd number according to an odd number [Περισσάκις 
δὲ περισσὸς ἀριθµός ἐστιν ὁ ὑπὸ περισσοῦ ἀριθµοῦ µετρούµενος κατὰ περισσὸν ἀριθµόν];  
 
– prime and composite numbers, in def. VII.12 and 14: 
 
a prime number is that <which is> measured only by unity [Πρῶτος ἀριθµός ἐστιν ὁ µονάδι µόνῃ 
µετρούµενος] […] a composite number is that <which is> measured by some number [Σύνθετος 
ἀριθµός ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθµῷ τινι µετρούµενος];  
 
– numbers prime and composite to one another, in def. VII.13 and 15: 
 
prime numbers to one another are those <which are> measured only by a unity as common 
measure [Πρῶτοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀριθµοί εἰσιν οἱ µονάδι µόνῃ µετρούµενοι κοινῷ µέτρῳ], and 
composite numbers to one another are those <which are> measured by some number as common 
measure [Σύνθετοι δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀριθµοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀριθµῷ τινι µετρούµενοι κοινῷ µέτρῳ];  
 
– commensurable and incommensurable magnitudes, in def. X.1: 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
translate both καταµετρέω and cognates and µετρέω and cognates, with ‘to measure’ and cognates, as it is 
usually done. 
6 In his edition, Heiberg brackets definition ι´ (by considering it interpolated: see I. L. Heiberg, 
Litterargeschichtliche Studien über Euklid, Leipzig 1882, p. 198), and does not translate it in Latin, by 
translating definition ια´ as definition 10, definition ιβ´ as definition 11, and so on. While Heath follows Heiberg 
Latin numeration, I follow his Greek one, by referring to definition ι´ as to definition 10*, as in the TLG. 
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commensurable magnitudes are said those <magnitudes that are> measured by the same measure, 
incommensurables, on the contrary, <those> of which it is not possible <that> there be a common 
measure [σύµµετρα µεγέθη λέγεται τὰ τῷ αὐτῷ µέτρῳ µετρούµενα, ἀσύµµετρα δέ, ὧν µηδὲν 
ἐνδέχεται κοινὸν µέτρον γενέσθαι];  
 
– segments commensurable and incommensurable by power, in def. X.2: 
 
<segments of> straight <lines> are commensurable by power when the squares on them are 
measured by the same surface, and incommensurable when it is not possible <that> a surface 
<providing> a common measure for the squares on them come out [εὐθεῖαι δυνάµει σύµµετροί 
εἰσιν, ὅταν τὰ ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν τετράγωνα τῷ αὐτῷ χωρίῳ µετρῆται, ἀσύµµετροι δέ, ὅταν τοῖς ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν 
τετραγώνοις µηδὲν ἐνδέχηται χωρίον κοινὸν µέτρον γενέσθαι].  
 
It seems, then, that, both for Aristotle and for Euclid, that of measure is a primitive notion, 
with ground on which others can be defined or elucidated, including some which appear to us 
as much more fundamental, as that of aliquot part or exact divisor of a number. It is, however, 
quite difficult, for us, to follow them in such an elucidatory process, going from measure to 
aliquot part, or exact divisor of a number. To clarify their view, it is much easier, for us, to 
invert the direction of elucidation and using our ideas of part or exact divisor of a number to 
elucidate their notion of measure. 
This makes clear that speaking of measure required, both for Euclid and for Aristotle, as 
well as for all contemporary mathematicians, having available both an additive operation and 
an equality relation directly defined on what is to be measured (not only numbers, but also 
magnitudes), or better on its parts. The reason is that nothing can be conceived as being an 
aliquot part of a whole without conceiving such a whole are resulting from an additive 
composition of it with other items (or parts) equal to it in some relevant respect7. 
However, the nature of the additive operation and the equality relation changes, of course, 
from species to species (adding two segments is, for example, quite another thing that adding 
two numbers). Moreover, even among the elements of a same specie, one can conceive 
different additive operations or equality relations: adding two squares so to get another square 
is, for example, another thing that adding them to get a gnomon, and adding several rectangles 
whose heights are equal to get a square is another thing than adding several squares to get 
another square. Hence, under this understanding, the relation of being a measure of is in no 
way unique in nature (if not for its being a relation between an aliquot part of a whole and this 
very whole). 
The connection between measure and aliquot part makes also clear that a quantity that has 
a measure has, in fact, several equal measures (at least two) of the same nature, and can even 
have different measures of the same nature, none of which is a measure of another, since it 
can not only admit different ways of being break down in aliquot parts, but also different 
aliquot parts of the same nature, none of which is an aliquot part of another. This is shown by 
the following example: 
                                                
7 Notice that having this operation and this relation available also makes it easy to define an order relation, 
since it allows us to state that b is strictly smaller than a if a results from an additive composition of b with some 
c, as openly suggested by Euclid, in common notion I.8 of the Elements: “the whole is greater than the part [τὸ 
ὅλον τοῦ µέρους µεῖζον ἐστιν]”. 
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as well as from the simple observation that if n and m are whatever natural numbers greater 
than 1, and n × m = p, then both n and m are aliquot parts of p8. 
Moreover, this connection also makes clear that—while any pair of numbers have a 
common measure, as implied by Euclid both in stating definition VII.12 an in proving 
proposition VII.4 of the Elements9—it is possible to have homogenous magnitudes admitting 
no common measure, that is, incommensurable magnitudes10. The example of the side and the 
diagonal of a square (that Aristotle pervasively appeals to in his treatises) clearly illustrates 
this fact. However, of course, from the fact that two magnitudes are incommensurable to one 
another does in no way follow that one of them has no measure, nor that it has not several 
different measures, none of which is a measure of another. The example in the previous figure 
immediately shows, indeed, that any segment has several different measures, none of which is 
a measure of another, and this is, of course, also the case both for the diagonal and the side of 
a square, as Aristotle clearly says in the last sentence quoted above from Metaphysics I, 1: 
“the diagonal is measured by two, and <so> the side, and all magnitudes”. In light of his 
conception of measure, this claim is crystal clear, although it has been so many times 
misinterpreted or considered to be “a complete puzzle”11. Again, if a and b are two 
incommensurable segments, there is certainly a smaller enough part of one of them, let as say 
of a, which is equal to a part of b (or is even directly a part of it), without being an aliquot part 
of it, and that, consequently, is not a measure of b, being rather incommensurable with it. Any 
segment has, then, parts that are incommensurable with it. Moreover, insofar as segments 
reflect the quantitative relations among whatever sort of homogenous magnitudes—in a way 
that is similar to that in which real numbers reflect the quantitative relations of homogenous 
                                                
8 This is so, of course, also if n and m are prime to each other. But, if this is so, it is immediately clear that 
none of them is an aliquot part of the other, and, then, a measure of it. Also, the example provided by the figure 
pertains to mutual primality of the number of the relevant parts. If we take the whole segment to be a, and its 
aliquot parts represented in the figure (by the two first small segments on the left) to be b and c, respectively, we 
shall have that a = 4b = 3c, and it is enough to observe that 3 and 4 are prime each to another to conclude that b 
cannot be an aliquot part of c. 
9 This proposition states that “any number is either part or parts of any number, the less of the greater [ἅπας 
ἀριθµὸς παντὸς ἀριθµοῦ ὁ ἐλάσσων τοῦ µείζονος ἤτοι µέρος ἐστὶν ἢ µέρη]”. If definitions VII.3-4 are taken 
literally (see above), this is an obvious tautology. Still, in proving proposition VII.4, Euclid assumes that two 
numbers which are not prime to one another either are such that the less measures the greater or have a common 
measure, and that a number is parts of another if an aliquot part of the former is also an aliquot part of the 
latter—as, it happens, for instance, with 3 and 5 or with 4 and 6: in both cases, the first number is parts of the 
second, since the latter results by additive composition of an aliquot part of the former with itself 
(5 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1, 6 = 2 + 2 + 2). This makes the proposition state, in fact, that, for any two distinct 
numbers, either one of them is an aliquot part of the other, or an aliquot part of one of them is also an aliquot part 
of the other, which (though being quite easy to be proved) is surely not a tautology. This is what Euclid proves, 
indeed (although in a so uselessly complex way to raise many suspects about the role and authenticity of this 
proposition). 
10 Notice that, though being still in use, the adjective ‘incommensurable’—literally translating the Greek 
‘ἀσύµµετρος’—is no more in line with our notion of measure, since, for us, two incommensurable magnitudes 
are not such to have no common measure (as stated by definition X.1, quoted above), but rather such to have no 
respective measures (in the first of the three modern senses distinguished above), whose ratio is that of two 
natural numbers. 
11 See T.L. Heath, Mathematics in Aristotle, Oxford 1949, p. 218. 
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magnitudes according to our modern notion of measure—, all this is also the case of any sort 
of magnitudes, without being, of course, the case of numbers (I shall arrive to this point soon). 
It follows that, according to the conception I’m describing, not only both magnitudes and 
numbers have measures, and the latter are not measures of the former12, but it also happens 
that the order of numbers only reflects the order of the measures of a domain of (homogenous 
and) commensurable magnitudes, but not that of the measures of any sort of magnitudes. 
One might argue that this is merely due to the fact that Greek mathematicians had a poorer 
conception of numbers than our own—that their numbers only corresponded, as I have said 
above, to our natural numbers greater than one, and, for this reason, were not able to mimic 
the crucial phenomenon of incommensurability, which is proper to magnitudes. Relative to 
domains of commensurable magnitudes—one might continue to argue—their numbers 
worked, in fact, as our (real) ones work relative to any sort of magnitudes, when our notion of 
measure is at issue. Reasoning in this manner, one would, then, finally conclude that, with 
respect to such restricted domains, the difference between our and their conception of 
measure is merely terminological: it merely consists in the fact that they were using the term 
“measure” to refer to aliquot parts of magnitudes, rather than to evoke the relations 
connecting these parts to numbers. 
This would be, however, a way to inverse the order of factors in the reconstruction of the 
difference between the two conceptions. Since the reason that made Greek numbers unable to 
play the role that our numbers play within our conception of measure was just that they were 
not able to mimic the phenomenon of incommensurability, rather than vice versa. It is, then, 
because of this last fact that the Greek conception of measure pertains to a relation between 
homogenous relata, rather then, as ours, to a relation between magnitudes and numbers. The 
phenomenon of incommensurability does not forbid, indeed, that something might play for 
magnitudes a role structurally akin (though quite different in its specific nature) to the one 
that (real) numbers play today in connection to measure. I just evoked this fact by observing 
that segments reflect the quantitative relations among whatever sort of homogenous 
magnitudes. It is now time to endow it with greater clarity. 
This depends on Eudoxus’s theory of proportion, which though transmitted to us by the 5th 
book of Euclid’s Elements, was certainly already in place, in its essential aspects, in 
Aristotle’s time, and which he also takes as a given. This theory permits to establish a four-
place relation of proportionality—of being “ἀνάλογον”, both in Euclid’s and Aristotle’s 
parlance13—among four magnitudes whatsoever, provided they be homogenous two by two. 
This makes the statement that two homogeneous magnitudes whatsoever are in proportion 
                                                
12 Notice that it seems to be so also for the late Pytagorean school. In the fr. 2 of pseudo-Archytas, De 
Intellectu, one reads that “number is measure of multitude, foot of length, balance of poise and counterpoise, rule 
and plumb line of straightness in both horizontal and vertical direction, <that is the> right angle [πλάθεος µὲν 
γὰρ µέτρον ἀριθµός, µάκεος δὲ ποῦς, ῥοπᾶς δὲ καὶ σταθµοῦ ζυγόν, ὀρθότατος δὲ καὶ εὐθύτατος κανὼν καὶ 
στάθµα, ὀρθὰ γωνία]” ( = 37,16-18 Thesleff). If numbers are taken to be “multitude[s] composed of unities”, as 
for Euclid (see above), this implies that numbers are measure of numbers but not of other quantities. 
13 Concerning Aristotle, and limited to the Physics, see: IV.8, 215b3, 29 and 216a7, VII, 5, 250a4, 8, 14, 28, 
VIII, 10, 266b 2, 19. I only quote, as an example, the passage including 250a4: “Let, then, Α be the mover, Β the 
moved, Γ the quantity of the distance [on which the moved is] moved, and Δ the time in which [it is so]. In the 
same time [Δ], the same mover Α will move half of Β twice Γ, and on [the whole] Γ in the half of Δ, so that there 
will be proportion [εἰ δὴ τὸ µὲν Α τὸ κινοῦν, τὸ δὲ Β τὸ κινούµενον, ὅσον δὲ κεκίνηται µῆκος τὸ Γ, ἐν ὅσῳ δέ, ὁ 
χρόνος, ἐφ’οὗ τὸ Δ, ἐν δὴ τῷ ἴσῳ χρόνῳ ἡ ἴση δύναµις ἡ ἐφ’οὗ τὸ Α τὸ ἥµισυ τοῦ Β διπλασίαν τῆς Γ κινήσει, 
τὴν δὲ τὸ Γ ἐν τῷ ἡµίσει τοῦ Δ· οὕτω γὰρ ἀνάλογον ἔσται] (249b30—250a4)”. Concerning Euclid, it will be 
enough to mention the def. V.6 of the Elements: “end let the magnitudes having in the same ratio be said in 
proportion [τὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχοντα λόγον µεγέθη ἀνάλογον καλείσθω]”. What Euclid means by four magnitudes 
to have the same ratio is made clear in definition V.5. The notoriety, ambiguity and complexity of this last 
definition suggest me to avoid quoting and discussing it, here. It will be enough to say that none of the 
ambiguities and difficulties concerning with it affects what I’m arguing about the notion of measure. 
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with two segments sensible. Even if this does not makes these two segments easy to identify 
in any case, this is enough, together with the provable existence of the fourth proportional of 
any triad of segments14, to explain what it means that segments reflect, as I have said, the 
quantitative relations among whatever sort of homogenous magnitudes: for any two 
homogenous magnitudes α and β of whatever sort and any given segment a, there will be a 
second segment b, such that α  : β = a  : b. Still, segments are magnitudes and, though they 
easily admit an additive operation, they do not admit a multiplicative one—that is, 
mathematically speaking, they form an ordered (and complete) additive group, but certainly 
not a ring, a fortiori not a field. This is a fundamental, structural difference between the way 
(real) numbers work, for us, in connection to measure, and the way segments reflect the 
quantitative relations among whatever sort of homogenous magnitudes. Another pertains to 
the fact that the latter way depends on the fourth-place relation of proportionality, rather than 
on the binary one of measure (in the third of the modern senses distinguished above). 
These conceptions—so different from ours, as I hope to have shown—fashioned 
mathematics from the discovery of the incommensurability of the side and the diagonal, at 
least up to the 17th century. They called for a radical separation of arithmetic and geometry, 
which was definitively overcome only in the 19th century. It seems to me that all that Aristotle 
takes for granted about measure, in relation to mathematics and physics, can be understood 
only by switching from our own to this conception of measure. 
 
3. Physics VIII, 9 and VIII, 10 
 
This does not only concern what Aristotle explicitly says about measure, in relation to 
mathematics and physics, but also, overall, what he does not say about it. 
In what follows I shall mainly focus on what he does and does not say in the passage of 
Physics V 3 mentioned above. Before coming to that, however, let me take some more space 
to consider something else he says. 
I’d like in particular to consider the two other passages from the Physics also mentioned 
above, from VIII, 9, and VIII, 10, respectively. 
 
3a. The passage from VIII, 10 
The latter is simpler to understand. Aristotle considers the possibility of taking, within a finite 
magnitude, a force homogenous to another finite one that is supposed to reside in an infinite 
magnitude, in such a way that the former be a measure of the latter. 
This supposition would simply be nonsensical if it were to be intended in light of our 
notion of measure, since, for us, the measure of a force is certainly not a force. It would also 
be nonsensical, however, if it were not established that a given force, as big as it might be, 
could have a measure as small as required, so small as to reside within any given magnitude, 
as small as it might be—since Aristotle does not seem to make any requirement on the sizes 
of the relevant forces and of the finite magnitude15. Insofar as the reference seems here to be 
to extended physical magnitudes, this depends on the assumption that both forces and 
extended physical magnitudes can be infinitely divided. This is reminiscent of his conclusion, 
                                                
14 See, Elements, prop. VI.12: “To find the fourth proportional to three given [segments of] straight [line] 
[τριῶν δοθεισῶν εὐθειῶν τετάρτην ἀνάλογον προσευρεῖν]”. The construction is quite simple: if a, b, and c are 
the three given segments, it is enough to get two (long enough) non-collinear segments AF and AG, sharing the 
extremity A, and cut two segments AB and BD, respectively equal to a equal to b, on the former, and another 
segment AC equal to c, on the latter, then draw the segment BC and the parallel to it through D; if this parallel 
cut AG in E, then CE is the required fourth proportional, since AB : BD = AC : CE. 
15 Notice that the point I’m making is independent of what it might mean for a force to reside in a magnitude: 
an interesting question, which is however not relevant for my present purpose. 
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in Physics VI, 2, about the infinite divisibility both of time and extended magnitudes—one of 
the crucial achievements of his whole treatise. The effort to reach such a conclusion, there, 
and its application, here (under the replacement of time with force), while speaking of 
measure, illustrate an important point: though mathematics, in particular the notion of 
measure coming from it, is taken as a given, by Aristotle, its applicability to physical matters 
is not; it rather requires to be established. This is one of the major concerns of his treatise, in 
my mind. 
 
3b. The passage from VIII, 9 
The passage from VIII, 9 is more problematic. Aristotle seems to argue both that circular 
locomotion is the first motion since it is the measure of all other motions, and that it is their 
measure because it is the first. Here my ‘since’ renders Aristotle’s ‘γὰρ’, my ‘because’ his 
‘διότι’. If both are intended to indicate a causal relation, the problem is evident, since nothing 
can be the cause of its own cause. So, either Aristotle’s argument is a paralogism, or at least 
one of these particles does not have a causal force. 
The argumentative context of the passage—which is part of an argument aiming to 
establish that circular locomotion is the first motion—is not enough to conclude that the 
former has such a force (and, then, not the latter, if any paralogism is to be avoided)16, since 
nothing ensures that Aristotle’s argument is intended to mirror what he was taking to be the 
causal order of things17. But, even if it were not—that is, even if Aristotle were maintaining 
that the circular locomotion being the first motion makes it be the measure of all other ones18 
—, his argument would still require establishing, on independent bases, that circular 
locomotion is the measure of all other motions. 
Furthermore, this would also be so if Aristotle’s claim were merely intended to mean that 
circular locomotion is the measure of all other motions if and only if it is the first. Since the 
argument for the primality of circular locomotion would, then, be based on this double 
implication and on the other premise that this motion is the measure of all other motions, to 
conclude, by modus ponens, without involving any causal relation, that it is the first motion. 
This seems to be the Aquinas’s interpretation (In Phys., lib. VIII, cap. IX, lect. XX, n. 2). 
According to Aquinas, that circular locomotion is the measure of all other motions is just 
what Aristotle would have proven in IV 14, 223b18-2119. This reconnects the point to that 
discussed in IV 10-14, namely time as number and/or measure of motion. The question is 
discussed by Sylvain Delcomminette in his paper on this same volume, and I cannot but refer 
to what he says there. There is, here, only room for a few observations. 
In 223b18-21, Aristotle claims this: 
 
If, then, the first <is the> measure of all the homogenous, uniform locomotion in circle <is> above 
all measure, since the number of this is best known; <and> neither alteration, nor increasing, nor 
generation are uniform, but locomotion is <so> [εἰ οὖν τὸ πρῶτον µέτρον πάντων τῶν συγγενῶν, ἡ 
κυκλοφορία ἡ ὁµαλὴς µέτρον µάλιστα, ὅτι ὁ ἀριθµὸς ὁ ταύτης γνωριµώτατος. ἀλλοίωσις µὲν οὖν 
οὐδὲ αὔξησις οὐδὲ γένεσις οὐκ εἰσὶν ὁµαλεῖς, φορὰ δ’ ἔστιν].  
 
                                                
16 Under this reading, the circular locomotion being the first motion would merely entail that it is the measure 
of all other motions, without making it so, while its being such a measure makes it the first motion. 
17 Thanks to Sylvain Delcomminette for suggesting this to me. 
18 While its being such measure merely entails that it is the first motion. 
19 According to Ross (Aristotle’s Physics, A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by W.D. Ross, 
Oxford, 1936, p. 719) for Aristotle this would be, instead, a “fact […] obvious in itself”, that he would have 
merely “noted” in 223b19. 
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Though the claim, here, is not plainly that circular locomotion is the measure of all other 
motions insofar as it is the first, it does not seem to be able to provide the argument—
allowing to establish that the circular locomotion is the measure of all other motions 
independently of the premise that it is the first one—which is required to license the other 
argument of 265b8-11. All that Aristotle seems to say here, which is not also said in this last 
passage, is that circular locomotion is the first motion insofar as its number is best known, and 
that it is uniform, while alteration, increasing, and generation are not (from which he takes to 
follow, by modus ponens, that it is the measure of all other motions, provided that what is the 
first among homogeneous is the measure of them). Unless one admitted that the appeal to the 
fact that that circular locomotion is the first motion is here immaterial—namely that Aristotle 
is merely arguing, in fact, that circular locomotion is the measure of all other motion insofar 
as it is uniform, while alteration, increasing, and generation are not, and its number is best 
known—it seems, then, hard not to see some sort of petitio principi in the conjunction of 
223b18-21 and 265b8-11. Aristotle’s point seems, indeed, that circular locomotion is the first 
and it is the measure of all other motions (rather that it is the former insofar as it is the latter 
or vice versa), as shown by the fact that it is uniform (while no other sort of motion is, better 
can be, so), and its number is best known. 
A way to avoid the problem might be trusting what Aristotle says just before, namely that 
(223b16-18) 
 
<it is> by a motion limited in time <that> the quantity of motion and time is measured [ὑπὸ τῆς 
ὡρισµένης κινήσεως χρόνῳ µετρεῖται τῆς τε κινήσεως τὸ ποσὸν καὶ τοῦ χρόνου].  
 
Any logical subtlety apart, Aristotle’s line of argument might, then, be the following: the 
circular and uniform locomotion of the first heaven is the measure of any other motion, since 
it is made manifest by the alternation of day and night, and the constant total time of a day 
and a night can be taken, in turn, as a privileged measure of time, and motions stay to each 
others as the times to complete them (provided that the same change be produced by them). 
This argument seems independent of the assumption that circular locomotion is the first 
motion, and leads to the conclusion that the circular locomotion of the first heaven is the 
measure of any other motion. If this were considered enough for concluding, more generally, 
that circular locomotion is the measure of any other motion, we would then have an argument 
for this conclusion that is independent of this assumption, and it is, therefore, appropriate for 
licensing the other argument of 265b8-11. 
Now, the former argument depends on Eudoxus’s theory of proportion, in particular on the 
possibility that this theory concedes to make two homogenous magnitudes, in this case two 
times, form a proportion with two other homogenous magnitudes of a different species, in this 
case two motions (producing the same change). Once again, mathematics would be taken for 
granted, rather than discussed, and would be used to prove what is to be proved, namely that 
circular locomotion is the measure of all other motions. 
This interpretation seems to me all the more convenient that the passage from this 
locomotion to time and from time to any other motion makes clear the sense in which 
Aristotle could have taken circular locomotion to be a measure of other motions, including 
rectilinear locomotion, despite his taking straight lines and circles “not comparable 
[οὐ συµβλητά]” to each others (248b4-7)20. 
                                                
20 This would also explain how Aristotle can argue that time measures motion, though time is not 
homogenous with motion. Indeed, as rightly observed by Delcomminette in his paper included in this same 
volume (to which I refer for the indication of the relevant passages), “en réalité, c’est toujours un mouvement qui 
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4. What Aristotle Says in V 3 About Measure 
 
I can, now, come to what Aristotle says in V 3, 226b32-34, which is not a small thing. Indeed, 
he says at least four things: 
i) that two places are contrary each to another if they are “the most distant in straight line”; 
ii) that straight line is “the minimum to be limited”, namely, if I understand well, the 
minimal line connecting two given places, or, better, points; 
iii) that “that <which is> limited is measure”, namely—if I once again understand 
correctly—that only something limited can be a measure; 
iv) that (ii) and (iii) entail (i)21. 
If the minimal line is intended to be minimal among all possible polygonal chains, claim 
(ii) is an immediate consequence of proposition I.20 of Euclid’s Elements22. In all its 
generality, it cannot, of course, be proved in the setting of Euclid’s geometry, which concerns 
no other line than straight lines and circumferences. Still, under a natural notion of a line, it is 
easy to imagine a proof of it by exhaustion founded on visual evidence, which any Greek 
mathematician would have accepted. Archimedes takes it to be a liminal assumption (or 
“λαµβανόµενος”, in its language) of his On the Sphere and Cylinder23. One can then say, 
rigorously enough, that this was an accepted truth in Greek geometry. 
Claim (iii) immediately follows from the very notion of a measure as aliquot part, at least 
when this is applied to extended magnitudes, like lines, as it is only required in the context of 
Aristotle’s argument. 
Claim (iv) can, of course, be contested, but, with a quite natural understating of the notion 
of what counts as contrary with respect to place (in Aristotle’s sense), it is much more than 
plausible24. 
Finally, if claims (ii)-(iv) are accepted, claim (i) then, of course, follows. 
Hence, though Aristotle says much, here, this seems to be both plain enough and in line 
with mathematics of his time. 
This does not mean, however, that it is trivial, since it has the notable merit of explaining 
quite clearly, though implicitly, in which sense aliquot parts are measures; they are so since 
they allow for the use of counting to establish how big that which is measured is. In the 
particular case at issue, it allows for the use of counting to establish how far two places are, 
which requires, of course, the choice of a single canonical path on which the aliquot parts that 
are to be counted have to be taken. 
                                                                                                                                                   
mesure un mouvement, et un temps un temps; mais les deux sont corrélatifs, puisque le temps est “ quelque 
chose du mouvement ”, à savoir son nombre, et donc précisément ce qui peut être délimité en lui”. 
21 This point (iv) depends, of course, on assigning an implicative force to the particle ‘γάρ’ occurring in this 
passage. But this particle could also be taken as such to introduce an explanation. In this case (ii) and (iii) would 
be intended to explain, rather that to entail, (i). In her paper included in this same volume (§ 3), Giovanna 
Giardina takes this to be the case for (ii), while she takes (iii) to be a mere addition. The main conclusions that I 
shall argue for here, concerning these claims—namely that they are in line with mathematics of Aristotle’s time 
and provide an implicit explanation of the sense in which aliquot parts are measures—do not essentially depend, 
however, on admitting my implicative reading against Giardina’s (and others’) explicative one. Thanks both to 
Giovanna Giardina herself and Sylvain Delcomminette for having attracted my attention on this point. 
22 Since this proposition states that “two sides of any triangle, taken together in whatever way are greater than 
the remaining one [παντὸς τριγώνου αἱ δύο πλευραὶ τῆς λοιπῆς µείζονές εἰσι πάντῃ µεταλαµβανόµεναι]”. 
23 This is the first one of book I: “Of the lines having the same extremities, let the straight [one] be the 
smallest [τῶν τὰ αὐτὰ πέρατα ἐχουσῶν γραµµῶν ἐλαχίστην εἶναι τὴν εὐθεῖαν]”. 
24 This seems to me to be so, also if point (iv) is intended as I have said in footnote (21), above. 
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Of course, under the conception described above, a straight line, namely the trajectory of 
this path, has, as Aristotle argues, infinitely many possible measures (in fact, uncountably 
many, as we know today), and Aristotle, as any mathematician of his time, was certainly 
aware of this (their uncountability apart, of course). Hence, what is relevant here is not, as it 
were, absolute counting, that is counting how many times a prefixed unity of measure enters a 
certain magnitude, but the constant ratio25 between the numbers resulting from counting any 
common aliquot part (or measure) of two given magnitudes: let these magnitudes be a and b, 
and c and c* whatever two common aliquot parts of them, such that a = mc = m*c* and b = nc 
= n*c*, then m : n = m*  : n* = a : b. 
This displays a crucial difference, which I have already accounted for in § 2 above, among 
the use of counting—namely of integer positive numbers—to identify the quantitative 
relations among two magnitudes, and our way to measure through numbers: the former only 
apply when common measures (in the Greek sense) are available, that is, only to 
commensurable magnitudes. Commensurability appears, then, as a condition of applicability 
of the Pythagorean program of numeralisation of nature. Although the discovery of the 
incommensurability of the side and the diagonal of a square makes clear that this program 
cannot be applied in general, commensurability discerns the portions of the word to which it 
can be applied. This should be enough to make clear the philosophical import that both the 
notion of measure and that of incommensurability—in particular the paradigmatic case of the 
incommensurability of the side and the diagonal of a square—had for a post-Pythagorean 
philosopher, as Aristotle was. 
This import pertains, however, to two purely mathematical notions and the basic results 
concerned with them. What such a post-Pythagorean philosopher could have done, 
concerning them, is just what Aristotle does here, though implicitly and in a quite particular 
case: not discussing, clarifying or amending them, but rather making this import clear through 
an enquiry regarding the way these notions can be used to account for the physical world. 
 
 
5. What Aristotle does not Say in V 3 About Measure 
 
However, one could retort: if this is in line with Aristotle’s passive approach to mathematics, 
it is, still, much more than nothing. It both responds to a pedagogical function that philosophy 
cannot refuse to have, and complies with a genuine philosophical mission, like that of 
searching for the conceptual frame of such an account—a mission that Aristotle considered to 
be both decisive and compelling. Consequently, if this is so, in which sense does 226b32-34 
manifest some sort of lack in philosophical elaboration, up to the point of making what 
Aristotle does not say in it relevant  ? 
The answer depends on the context of this passage, or, better, on the comparison between 
this context and its content, which I have just tried to clarify. 
This context pertains, as I have said above, to Aristotle’s elucidation, possibly even to his 
definition, of the relation of being intermediate. This elucidation, in turn, involves the notion 
of contrary, or, better, more generally, those of terminus a quo and terminus ad quem of a 
motion. In this context, Aristotle felt appropriate to make clear what being contrary means for 
places, and, consequently, for items having a place. Strictly speaking, this is not required by 
the internal logic of his elucidation, but it appears to be quite natural in light of the fact that 
this elucidation is part of a chain of similar elucidations concerning six other notions, all of 
which have a relevant application to spatial items, though not being exclusively attached to 
                                                
25 See footnote (13), above. 
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them: the notions of being “together [ἅµα]”, “apart [χωρίς]”, “joined [ἁπτόµενον]”, 
“consecutive [ἐφεξῆς]”, “contiguous [ἐχόµενον]” and “continuous [συνεχὲς]”. 
This, again, does not reveal what is lacking in 226b32-34. Rather, it makes us see what 
pushed Aristotle to insert the previous passage about contraries relative to place and measure. 
What is lacking becomes clear when one reflects on the last notion in the foregoing list: 
that of being continuous, or, better, to stay closer to Aristotle’s parlance, that of “the 
continuum [τὸ συνεχὲς]”. For is it not obvious, for us, that measure and continuity are strictly 
connected notions ? That elucidating one should be required for—or go, at least, naturally 
together with—elucidating the other ? What one is left wondering, then, is just this: that, 
despite his inserting this passage in a (quite complex) argumentation aiming at the elucidation 
of the notion of continuity (or the continuum), Aristotle does not take the occasion for 
establishing some conceptual link among measure and continuity, and leaves, rather, this 
passage essentially isolated in its context. Aristotle does not say which link connects measure 
with continuity. Why ? Is this lack only a lack for us, or is it, in a sense or another, also a lack 
for him ? 
Responding to these questions is the aim of the following part of my paper. 
To begin with, let us ask ourselves why we are accustomed to strictly connecting measure 
and continuity. The answer naturally results from what I have said about our notion of 
measure in § 2: when speaking of measure, we naturally think to measure of magnitudes by 
real numbers, and we consider that the ordered set formed by them is the continuum. More 
than that, we think of real numbers as being strictly connected to measure of magnitudes, 
either because this is, for us, their most important and natural application, or even because 
some of us could be willing to follow Frege26 (or others, like Hölder27, and, much more 
recently, Hale28) in arguing that real numbers should be defined as measures of magnitudes. 
The former motivation is, by far, more commonplace than the latter. It makes it for us 
natural, in teaching, to introduce real numbers by starting from natural ones, then passing to 
rationals and showing that these latter numbers cannot provide a measure of magnitudes that 
we are easily able to deal with—by appealing, for this purpose, to the example of the side and 
diagonal of a square—and finally proving that real numbers (conveniently defined starting 
from rational ones), not only allow us to express the ratio of the side and the diagonal of a 
square, but are also in biunivocal correspondence with the points that can be taken on an 
oriented straight line as the extremities of a segment originated in a fixed point of it, which 
makes possible to express the ratio between any two pairs of segments, and, consequently, 
convey geometrical continuity in an arithmetical way. 
This suggests that what appears to us as an evident lack in Aristotle’s treatment of 
continuity and measure is such only for us, provided that the way we naturally connect these 
notions requires tools that were perfectly unavailable to him. 
This provides a quite simple answer to our questions. However, though certainly correct, 
this answer is too simple—for our natural passage from real numbers in connecting measure 
to continuity is nothing but the reflex of a deeper and direct connection among these notions, 
which depends in no way on real numbers, but is rather the consequence of the phenomenon 
of incommensurability, conceived in the Greek sense as absence of a common measure 
(intended as a common aliquot part). To see this, it is enough to reflect on the fact that the 
incommensurability of the side and diagonal of a square is enough to show that geometrical 
                                                
26 See G. Frege, Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, H. Pohle, Jena 1893-1903 (2 vols), part III, vol. 2, §§ 55-245. 
27 See O. Hölder, “Die Axiome der Quantitat und die Lehre vom Mass”, Berichte über die Verhandlungen 
der Königlich Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig: mathematische und physikalische Klasse, 
53 (1901), pp. 1-64. 
28 See B. Hale “Reals by Abstraction”, Philosophia Mathematica, 3rd series, 8, 2000, pp. 100-123. 
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construction by rule and compass—the simplest form of construction involved in Greek 
geometry—provides us with pairs of incommensurable segments (in this sense), which is, in 
turn, enough to show that the continuity of segments makes some of them have no common 
measure (in the Greek sense). 
Our first answer requires, therefore, to be completed. To see how, it is important to observe 
that the notion of continuity enters the previous remark in a quite vague sense, to convey the 
visual intuition of an absence of gaps. But is this the way Aristotle was conceiving 
continuity ? 
The answer is clearly negative. His conception is much more complex and goes far away 
from geometry, and, more generally, mathematics, by rather providing a cornerstone of his 
own physics. When we look closely at this conception, in the way it is presented in V 3, we 
see that not only does it require no direct connection with measure, but rather makes 
continuity dependent on the absence of (actual) parts, and, then, also of aliquot (such) parts, 
which makes it perfectly orthogonal to measure, as conceived of by Aristotle. 
To justify this claim, I have to parse the whole passage of V 3 that 226b32-34 belongs to29. 
 
 
6. The Continuum 
 
Here is this passage, including—though, as said, not indispensably at all—the passage quoted 
above about contraries in relation to space and measure (226b21-227a17): 
 
I say, therefore, to be together those <things> according to place, insomuch as <they> are in one 
primary place, apart, instead, insomuch as <they are> in another <place>, while joined <those 
whose> extremities are together. | [However, since every change <happens> in the opposites, but 
the opposites are both the contraries and by contradiction, <and> in contradiction <there is> 
nothing in the middle, <it is> clear that the intermediate will be in the contraries. | To the 
minimum, the intermediate is in three <items>, for the contrary is the extreme of change,] while 
intermediate is <the thing> that what changes naturally reaches before <arriving at> the last 
towards which it changes, while changing continuously by nature. [To the minimum … of 
change]. It, then, moves continuously <that which> leaves nothing or very little of the thing—not 
of the time (for nothing prevents it from leaving <something> and that immediately after the 
hypate, the nete sounds) but of the things in which it moves. This is clear both in changes 
concerning place and in the others. Contrary concerning place <is> the most distant in straight 
line, since the <straight line> is the minimum to be limited and that <which is> limited <is> 
measure. Next, consecutive <is> that of which—by being after the beginning in position, in form 
or in some other respect <and being> so determined—there is no intermediate of the same kind of 
that <which> it is consecutive <of>. (I say, for example, that a line or lines <are consecutive> to a 
line, or a unit or units to a unit, or a house to a house; but nothing prevents that there be an 
intermediate of another <kind>). For the consecutive <is> consecutive to something and posterior 
to something; for one <is> not consecutive to two, nor the first day of the month <is> consecutive 
to the second, but the latter to the former. Contiguous, again, is that <which,> being consecutive, 
will be joined. [However … in the contraries]. Finally, the continuum is just some contiguous; I 
say it is continuous when the limit in which each of two <parts> join each other becomes the same 
and one, and, as the name points out, hold with. But this <is> not so, if the extremes are two. This 
having been laid down <it is> clear that the continuum is in those things from which, by nature, 
                                                
29 In doing that, I shall base on some material drawn from a joint working paper with Giovanna Giardina and 
Chiara Martini, who I thank for allowing me to use it.  
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some one is generated by contact. And as, once generated, that <which> holds with <becomes> 
one, so also the whole will be one, for example, <by a> bolt or glue or junction, or organic union.  
[ἅµα µὲν οὖν λέγω ταῦτ’ εἶναι κατὰ τόπον, ὅσα ἐν ἑνὶ τόπῳ ἐστὶ πρώτῳ, χωρὶς δὲ ὅσα ἐν ἑτέρῳ, 
ἅπτεσθαι δὲ ὧν τὰ ἄκρα ἅµα. [ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα µεταβολὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειµένοις, τὰ δ’ ἀντικείµενα τά 
τε ἐναντία καὶ τὰ κατὰ ἀντίφασιν, ἀντιφάσεως δ’ οὐδὲν ἀνὰ µέσον, φανερὸν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις 
ἔσται τὸ µεταξύ. | ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ µεταξὺ τρισίν· ἔσχατον µὲν γάρ ἐστι τῆς µεταβολῆς τὸ 
ἐναντίον,] µεταξὺ δὲ εἰς ὃ πέφυκε πρότερον ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὸ µεταβάλλον ἢ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον 
µεταβάλλει κατὰ φύσιν συνεχῶς µεταβάλλον. [ἐν ... εναντιον.] συνεχῶς δὲ κινεῖται τὸ µηθὲν ἢ ὅτι 
ὀλίγιστον διαλεῖπον τοῦ πράγµατος, µὴ τοῦ χρόνου (οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαλείποντα, καὶ εὐθὺς δὲ 
µετὰ τὴν ὑπάτην φθέγξασθαι τὴν νεάτην) ἀλλὰ τοῦ πράγµατος ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται. τοῦτο δὲ ἔν τε ταῖς 
κατὰ τόπον καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις µεταβολαῖς φανερόν. ἐναντίον δὲ κατὰ τόπον τὸ κατ’εὐθεῖαν 
ἀπέχον πλεῖστον· ἡ γὰρ ἐλαχίστη πεπέρανται, µέτρον δὲ τὸ πεπερασµένον. ἐφεξῆς δὲ οὗ µετὰ τὴν 
ἀρχὴν ὄντος ἢ θέσει ἢ εἴδει ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ οὕτως ἀφορισθέντος µηδὲν µεταξύ ἐστι τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ 
γένει καὶ οὗ ἐφεξῆς ἐστιν (λέγω δ’ οἷον γραµµὴ γραµµῆς ἢ γραµµαί, ἢ µονάδος µονὰς ἢ µονάδες, 
ἢ οἰκίας οἰκία· ἄλλο δ’ οὐδὲν κωλύει µεταξὺ εἶναι). τὸ γὰρ ἐφεξῆς τινὶ ἐφεξῆς καὶ ὕστερόν τι· οὐ 
γὰρ τὸ ἓν ἐφεξῆς τοῖν δυοῖν, οὐδ’ ἡ νουµηνία τῇ δευτέρᾳ ἐφεξῆς, ἀλλὰ ταῦτ’ ἐκείνοις. ἐχόµενον δὲ 
ὃ ἂν ἐφεξῆς ὂν ἅπτηται. [ἐπεὶ ... µεταξύ.] τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς ἔστι µὲν ὅπερ ἐχόµενόν τι, λέγω δ’ εἶναι 
συνεχὲς ὅταν ταὐτὸ γένηται καὶ ἓν τὸ ἑκατέρου πέρας οἷς ἅπτονται, καὶ ὥσπερ σηµαίνει τοὔνοµα, 
συνέχηται. τοῦτο δ’ οὐχ οἷόν τε δυοῖν ὄντοιν εἶναι τοῖν ἐσχάτοιν. τούτου δὲ διωρισµένου φανερὸν 
ὅτι ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ τὸ συνεχές, ἐξ ὧν ἕν τι πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν σύναψιν. καὶ ὥς ποτε 
γίγνεται τὸ συνέχον ἕν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἔσται ἕν, οἷον ἢ γόµφῳ ἢ κόλλῃ ἢ ἁφῇ ἢ προσφύσει.]  
 
A cursory scrutiny of this passage is enough to realize that the statement concerning the 
continuum appeals, either directly or indirectly, to five of the six relations previously 
introduced—those of being together, joined, intermediate, consecutive, and contiguous—and 
that that of being intermediate is introduced, in turn, by appealing to the property of 
“changing continuously by nature [µεταβάλλω κατὰ φύσιν συνεχῶς]”. Here is, indeed, the 
tree of dependences that this passage displays: 
 
If the elucidation of the property of naturally changing continuously required that of the 
continuum, Aristotle’s statement would be inescapably circular. This is not so, however, since 
Aristotle explains what he means with “moving continuously [συνεχῶς δὲ κινεῖται]” without 
any appeal to the continuum; and it seems quite natural to consider that he is intending to 
apply this explanation to the property of “changing continuously by nature”. This allows 
taking Aristotle’s elucidations of the relations of being together, intermediate, joined, 
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consecutive, contiguous and of the property of naturally changing continuously as genuine 
definitions, free of circularity and preliminary to the statement about the continuum. 
By going back along the tree, we might resume these definitions as follows: 
two items are contiguous if (and only if) they are both consecutive and joined, namely they 
admit no intermediate of the same kind (which makes them consecutive), and have 
extremities that are together (which makes them joined), provided that an item, say σ, is 
intermediate between two other items, say τ and θ, if what naturally changes continuously by 
nature and comes from τ reaches σ before reaching θ, and that two items are together if they 
are in one single primary place. 
 
6a. The Right Branch of the Tree 
Ross30 has observed that later, in V 3, 227a18, “Aristotle implies […] that ἐφεξῆς is a wider 
term including ἁπτόµενον”, which would make “ἐχόµενον […] a mere synonym of 
ἁπτόµενον”. Though he is right concerning 227a1831, it remains that, in the passage quoted 
above, Aristotle presents being joined and being contiguous as distinct relations. This is not 
only because their definitions appeal to two distinct webs of notions, but also because the 
definition of being consecutive and the dependency of that of being contiguous on it seem to 
imply that two items can bear both relations each to another only with respect to a certain 
change and only if they are of the same kind: two conditions which the relation of being 
joined is in no way submitted to. Let us consider these two conditions at once. 
Let us begin with the former. It makes an item not consecutive to another simpliciter, but 
in relation to a certain change, or, more generally, to a certain order. This is because Aristotle 
defines the relation of being intermediate, by appealing to the property of changing 
continuously by nature. If we insert Aristotle’s definition of moving continuously within that 
of being intermediate and take it as apt to define the property of changing continuously by 
nature, we get, indeed, the result that σ is intermediate between τ and θ if what changes in 
such a way as to leave “nothing or very little of the thing—not of the time” and comes from τ 
reaches σ before reaching θ. What exactly does it mean ? 
Though the definition of being consecutive comes after, and depends on that of being 
intermediate, understanding the former can help in understanding the latter. The broad sense 
of the definition of being consecutive is clear: two items are consecutive if they admit no 
intermediate of the same kind. Its details are, instead, far from being so. In stating this 
definition, Aristotle refers to 
 
that of which—by being after the beginning in position, in form or in some other respect <and 
being> so determined—there is no intermediate of the same kind of which it is consecutive.  
 
Moreover, in defining the property of naturally changing continuously, Aristotle 
alternatively uses the verbs ‘µεταβάλλω’ and ‘κινέω’. This suggests that we should take τ and 
θ (as well as σ) as liable to have different natures in different cases, namely according to 
whether the change concerns substance, quantity, quality or place. The possibility that there 
be some intermediate forces us, however, to discard change concerning substance, that is, 
generation or corruption. We should, then, apparently, take τ and θ, as well as σ, to be stages 
of an alteration, an augmentation or diminution, or a locomotion. 
                                                
30 See Aristotle’s Physics, cit., p. 626. 
31 The reference should be, in fact, to 227a18-19: “Since, that <which is> joined is, indeed, necessarily 
consecutive, <while> that <which is> consecutive <is> not all joined [τὸ µὲν γὰρ ἁπτόµενον ἐφεξῆς ἀνάγκη 
εἶναι, τὸ δ’ ἐφεξῆς οὐ πᾶν ἅπτεσθαι]”. 
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The “very little of the thing—not of time” that might be left by changing continuously by 
nature from τ to θ should, then, be intended as a gap occurring in one of these processes, so 
that something could so change by still leaving some non-temporal gaps. This is made quite 
clear by Aquinas’s comments (in Ph.: Lib. V, Cap. III, Lect. 4). He appeals to the example of 
“crossing a road, in which the stones are placed at a small distance from one other, through 
which a man crosses from one part of the road to another with continuous motion [transitibus 
viarum, in quibus ponuntur lapides modicum ab invicem distantes, per quos homo transit de 
una parte viae ad aliam, motu continuo]”. 
Both this and Aristotle’s example of the hypathe and the nete suggest a quite plausible 
interpretation. The appropriate way in which someone can cross a road using stepping stones 
is just by jumping from a stone to another, not by going down one, then going up another to 
avoid jumping. Analogously, the appropriate way for a sitarist to play a melody so conceived 
to pass from the lowest note to the highest, is just sounding the nete immediately after the 
hypate. This suggests that something changes continuously by nature by leaving some gaps in 
the thing, when leaving these gaps is required by the very particular nature of the change 
itself, namely when leaving these gaps makes the relevant subject pass from any given stage 
to that which is required by the order imposed by this nature. In other terms, Aristotle seems 
to take something to change continuously by nature when its change cannot be, by its nature, 
so refined to present more stages than those it passes through. 
It follows that τ and θ are consecutive with respect to a certain change if (and only if) the 
very nature of this change makes the relevant subject passes from the former to the latter 
without passing from any σ while achieving this change. Analogously, σ is intermediate 
between τ and θ if, by achieving this change, this subject passes from τ to it before reaching θ. 
Clearly, both conditions are independent of how τ, θ and, possibly, σ stand each to another 
with respect to some relevant substratum. Hence Aristotle’s definitions allow two bodies to 
not only be consecutive, with respect to a certain locomotion, without being joined, and, then, 
contiguous, but also to be joined without being consecutive, with respect to this locomotion, 
and, then, contiguous, again. This makes also clear why, according to Aristotle’s definitions, 
the relations of being consecutive and contiguous are relative to a certain change, while that 
of being joined is not. 
That these relations be not equivalent is also suggested by the second of the two conditions 
mentioned above, according to which two items can be consecutive, and, then, contiguous, 
only if they are of the same kind. 
Aristotle implies this by defining the consecutive as “that of which—by being after the 
beginning […] and being so determined—there is no intermediate of the same kind of that 
<which> it is consecutive <of>“. Though the exact interpretation of this passage is far from 
easy, it seems that Aristotle is taking, here, the “same kind” to be that of that to (or, better, of, 
in his parlance) which the consecutive is so, that is of the terminus a quo of the relevant 
change, or τ, in the previous notation. Although, this terminus is a quo as opposite to a 
terminus ad quem of this same change, namely θ, which is said, here, to be “determined” by 
its “being after the beginning”, namely just by its being the terminus ad quem of this change. 
The kind of both θ and τ seems, then, to be taken by Aristotle as being determined by this 
change, and being, then, the same. The appropriate way to understand the definition seems, 
then, to be this: θ is consecutive to (or of) τ if (and only if) τ and θ are homogeneous and 
admit no intermediate of their same kind. 
 
6b. The Left Branch of the Tree 
We should now look at the other branch of the tree and consider the definitions of being 
together and being joined. Focusing on them independently of the statement about the 
continuous would be quite artificial, however, since, despite its apparent obscurity, a quick 
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look to this statement is enough to notice a relevant analogy with these last definitions: 
whereas two items are said to be “joined” if their “extremities [ἄκρα]” are “together”, a 
continuum is said to obtain when the “limit [πέρας] in which each of two <parts> join each 
other [οἷς ἅπτονται] becomes the same and one [ταὐτὸ γένηται καὶ ἓν]”, and to be “in those 
things from which, by nature, some one [ἕν τι] is generated by contact [σύναψιν]”. The latter 
claim is echoed in VI, 1, 231a22: “continuous <is that> whose extremes <are> one [συνεχῆ 
µὲν ὧν τὰ ἔσχατα ἕν]”. 
This suggests paraphrasing the relevant aspect of Aristotle’s statement as follows: for a 
continuum to obtain the limits of the contiguous parts of the relevant item are not merely to be 
ἅµα but are rather to be ἕν. 
This arouses, however, a delicate problem: in light of the definitions of the relation of 
being together—according to which two items are together, “insomuch as <they> are in one 
primary place [ὅσα ἐν ἑνὶ τόπῳ ἐστὶ πρώτῳ]”—it is natural to wonder what it could mean, for 
two things, to be ἅµα without being ἕν, namely how we can conceive of being one as an 
additional feature in respect to being together. 
The difficulty becomes obvious when the definition of the relation of being together is 
compared to that of primary place (IV 4, 210b34-211a2), which openly suggests that being in 
the same primary place be the same as having exactly the same place, as being spatially 
indiscernable32. Provided that it would be odd to appeal to temporal discernibility to explain 
how the primary place of two distinct items could be the same, the question arises, then, of 
understating as it might happen that two distinct items be together. This requires 
understanding how the two notions of being ἅµα and being ἕν should be conceived without 
conflating them. 
Another difficulty depends on Aristotle’s appeal to the notion of place, since, if it is 
admitted that being together amounts to being together in place, it becomes difficult to see 
how the relations of being joined and contiguous can apply to items which, by their own 
nature, have no place; and this, in turn, makes it difficult to see how Aristotle’s statement 
about the continuum might pertain to such sorts of items. 
There is still more, since if being together amounts to being together in place, it also 
becomes difficult to see how extremities could be together, and, then, according to Aristotle’s 
definitions, how two items—even those having a place, including physical bodies—could be 
joined and, then, contiguous and, possibly, form a continuum. For, by restating his definition 
of place, he claims that this is “the limit of the encompassing body, insofar as it holds with the 
encompassed [τὸ πέρας τοῦ περιέχοντος σώµατος <καθ' ὃ συνάπτει τῷ περιεχοµένῳ>]” (IV 4, 
212a6-6a), thus implying that extremities have no place, provided that they, in turn, have no 
limits. 
Some help comes from what Aristotle says in IV 10, 218a25-27 and IV 11, 219a14-19, 
namely that 
 
being together according to the time and being neither prior nor posterior is being in one and the 
same now [τὸ ἅµα εἶναι κατὰ χρόνον καὶ µήτε πρότερον µήτε ὕστερον τὸ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἶναι καὶ ἑνὶ 
[τῷ] νῦν ἐστιν],  
 
and that 
 
                                                
32 Here is Aristotle’s statement: “we claim, indeed, that the place is firstly <that which> encompasses that of 
which it is place, and <is> nothing of the thing, and the primary is neither smaller, nor greater <than it> 
[ἀξιοῦµεν δὴ τὸν τόπον εἶναι πρῶτον µὲν περιέχον ἐκεῖνο οὗ τόπος ἐστί, καὶ µηδὲν τοῦ πράγµατος, ἔτι τὸν 
πρῶτον µήτ’ἐλάττω µήτε µείζω]”. 
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prior and posterior are primarily in place [τὸ […] πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τόπῳ πρῶτόν ἐστιν]”, 
since they are “in magnitude [ἐν τῷ µεγέθει],  
 
and then “in motion [ἐν κινήσει]”, and, because of that, “in time [ἐν χρόνῳ]”. This suggests 
that being together in place is, for Aristotle, a basic relation, in terms of which the more 
general relation of being together tout court is to be defined. One could, then, consider that 
Aristotle’s aim was only that of defining such a relation in a basic, and possibly paradigmatic 
case, though tacitly leaving the possibility open for a generalisation to be made when the 
definition would have been appealed later. If this is so, the second difficulty dissolves. 
However the problem remains of understanding how Aristotle’s definition of being 
together (in place) is to be translated into a relation between items that have no place. This is 
a difficult question to be answered in general. But we can suppose that Aristotle was hoping 
that taking his definitions of being together and joined cum grano salis would have been 
enough for making them clearly suggest whether these relations obtain or not, in some 
relevant paradigmatic cases concerned with items having a place, and that this was sufficient 
for his purpose. 
We remain, then, with the problem of understanding the distinction between being ἅµα (in 
a place) and of being ἕν. Ross33 suggests two ways of solving the problem. He wonders how 
“two [distinct] things can[…] [be] ἅµα κατὰ τόπον”, provided that “the place which contains 
nothing but A cannot contain nothing but B”. Here are two ways of how being ἅµα κατὰ 
τόπον might be understood, according to him, in order to overcome the difficulty: 
 (1) Whatever two items having a place are ἅµα if they are the same item that “discharges 
two functions”, namely, by using another parlance than Ross’s, if they are intensionally two, 
though being extensionally one; it would follow, if I understand correctly, that these items 
would be ἕν if they also discharge the same function, namely they are also intensionally one. 
(2) Whatever item having a place are ἅµα if they are distinct items but “they are in one 
place which contains nothing but the two, i.e. where there is nothing between them”, namely, 
in he same parlance as above, if they are extensionally two, though occupying the same 
(primary) place; it would follow, if I understand correctly again, that these items are ἕν if they 
are the same item, namely they are extensionally one, though possibly discharging two 
functions, namely though possibly being intensionally two. 
Ross discards (1), but his reasons for that are far from convincing, at least to me34. 
Moreover, answer (2) does not match at all with the theory of places expounded in book IV. 
                                                
33 See Aristotle’s Physics, cit., p. 627. 
34 Here is his argument (ibidem); “since ἅµα is used in the definition not of continuity but of the less close 
relation of contact [i.e. of being joined, in my translation] (226b23), and the unity of two ἄκρα is expressly 
distinguished from their being ἅµα (227a22-3), it is evident that Aristotle's meaning is not […][(1)]”. Both 
reasons seems circular to me. As for the first, consider that supposing that the meaning of being ἅµα is that 
conveyed in (1) has, as a consequence, that two items (having a place) are contiguous if one extremity on each of 
them is the same as one of the other. This would work against interpretation (1), as required by Ross, only if it 
were granted that Aristotle was taking two such items are continuous (taking, then, continuity to be a binary 
relation). But admitting (1) just leads, as we shall see, to deny that this is so, whence the circularity. As for the 
second reason, consider what Aristotle says in 227a21-23, “indeed if [something is] continuum [it is] necessary 
[it] be joined, but if joined [it is] not [necessary it be] continuous, since [it is] not necessary [that] the extremities 
of [the things] themselves be one if they are together [εἰ µὲν συνεχές, ἀνάγκη ἅπτεσθαι, εἰ δ’ ἅπτεται, οὔπω 
συνεχές· οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἓν εἶναι αὐτῶν τὰ ἄκρα, εἰ ἅµα εἶεν]”. This would undermine interpretation (1) only if 
being one were understood as being extensionally one, rather than also intensionally, as required by this 
interpretation. According to it, what Aristotle is saying here is merely that it is possible that one same extremity 
discharges two functions, and counts, then, as two items that are merely ἅµα, without being also ἕν, that is, 
intensionally one. Hence this would be an evidence against this interpretation, only if this interpretation were 
rejected, whence the circularity, anew.  
	   23 
Indeed, the idea that a single primary place could contain two distinct items, extensionally 
speaking, is hardly compatible with the definition of proper place mentioned above. 
To avoid this unpleasant conclusion, one could consider that Ross’s point is not that this is 
possible, but rather that two items are ἅµα if the primary place of their compound (or 
mereological union, as we would say today) contains nothing but them35. If it were admitted 
that Aristotle considered this compound as a genuine (single) item having a place (which 
could be hardly granted, it seems to me), this could not contradict Aristotle’s theory of place. 
Whereas, if it did not, then, it would make his definition of being ἅµα such to make ἅµα any 
two items whatsoever having a place, as spatially distant as they might be. Unless the 
definition were made more precise by maintaining that two such items are in one primary 
place if the place of their compound contained only them, either in the sense that it did not 
include room for any possible other item—which would be, anew, incompatible avec 
Aristotle’s theory of place (by conveying the idea that place is nothing but a portion of space, 
understood as an external and fixed container)—or in the sense that they admit no 
intermediary among them—which would, in turn, either make the definition of being ἅµα 
conflate with that of being joined, or depend on a definition of being intermediary alternative 
to that Aristotle provides in V 3 (which would be, by the way, quite hard to imagine, at least 
for me). 
This leads me to favour option (1). 
 
6c. Two Orthogonal Notions 
One thing to be noticed about this option is this: despite Ross’s presenting it as being 
concerned with items having a place, according to it (as well according to option (2), by the 
way), requiring that, for a continuum to obtain, the limits of the relevant parts of some items 
be, not merely ἅµα, but rather ἕν, renders ipso facto the question of whether these parts or 
items have a place immaterial, since both the condition of being intensionally two but 
extensionally one, and that of being intensionally—and, then, also extensionally—one, are 
perfectly intelligible independently of any sort of consideration concerning whatever sort of 
place. 
Hence this answer suggests a way to understand Aristotle’s statement about the continuum 
that makes it free from any restriction to items having a place. Here it is: 
 (1a) an item which has homogenous parts that, in turn, have extremities is continuous (or 
a continuum), relative to an appropriate change making these parts consecutive two by two 
under the order it induces, if (and only if) the extremities of each pair of consecutive parts 
cannot be distinguished functionally, namely are intensionally one. 
The clause about consecutiveness could be avoided so as to make the condition 
independent of the reference to a certain appropriate change or order. This would result in the 
following condition: 
(1b) an item which can be divided into homogenous parts having extremities is continuous 
(or a continuum), if (and only if) whatever parts into which it could be divided might be made 
consecutive two by two under the order induced by an appropriate change in such a way that 
the extremities of each pair of consecutive parts could not be distinguished functionally, 
namely are intensionally one (by possibly requiring that this obtain for whatever such order). 
If, moreover, it were conceded to disregard the dependency of Aristotle’s statement from 
the definition of the relation of being consecutive, one could finally state that: 
(1c) an item which can be divided into parts having extremities is continuous (or a 
continuum), if (and only if) whatever parts into which it could be divided might be made to 
                                                
35 I thank anew Sylvain Delcomminette for suggesting to me this possible interpretation of Ross’s point. 
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have extremities which could not be distinguished functionally two by two, namely that could 
be intensionally one two by two. 
At first glance, these conditions have all the highly unsuitable consequence that, according 
to them, no item could be continuous (or be a continuum), since the extremities of whatever 
two distinct parts of whatever item (divisible into parts) cannot but be functionally distinct, or 
intensionally two. Even if two parts shared, indeed, an extremity, this might always be 
considered both as an extremity of one of these parts and as an extremity of the other. No 
matter how unsuitable as this consequence might be considered to be, this last remark is the 
key to the interpretation I favour, since the very simple remark that such a consequence is 
openly unsuitable suggests reading Aristotle’s statement as supplying a sort of description by 
reductio to absurdum. 
In a nutshell, the point is that this consequence follows only if the relevant parts are taken 
to be actual. One could retort that both conditions (1b) and (1c) concern, in fact, potential, not 
actual, parts. However, this is in fact wrong. What is true is that these conditions concern 
items that can be divided into appropriate parts by appealing to a circumstance that is required 
to obtain (though it cannot obtain) in case such a division were realised. Their consequence is, 
then, not that no item divisible into parts could be continuous (or be a continuum), but that it 
could not be so once the division were realised. 
This is not only far from unsuitable, but also far from surprising, and it is rather perfectly 
in line with the further arguments Aristotle advances in his treatise about continuity, since it 
simply entails that any sort of division of whatever item into (actual) parts breaks the 
continuity. This suggests the following rephrasing of conditions (1a-c): 
(1a*) an item is continuous (or a continuum) relative to an appropriate change if (and only 
if) it has no actual parts but is liable to be divided into homogenous parts that could be made 
consecutive two by two under the order induced by this change. 
(1b*) an item is continuous (or a continuum) if (and only if) it has no actual parts but is 
liable to be divided into homogenous parts in such a way that, however this division be 
realized, the resulting parts can be made consecutive two by two under the order induced by 
an appropriate change. 
(1c*) an item is continuous (or a continuum) if (and only if) it has no actual parts but is 
liable to be divided into parts. 
By reinserting in condition (1c*) part of what is suggested by the dependence of Aristotle’s 
statement from the definition of the relation of being consecutive, one would finally get the 
following condition: 
(1c**) an item is continuous (or a continuum) if (and only if) it has no actual parts but is 
liable to be divided into homogenous parts. 
Though quite different from each other, conditions (1a*-c*) all convey the same basic 
idea: what Aristotle requires for an item to be continuous (or to be a continuum) is that it have 
no actual parts, but only potential ones, namely that it be “actually indivisible [ἀδιαίρετον 
[…] ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ]”, but not “potentially indivisible [ἀδιαίρετον […] ἢ δυνάµει]” (De anima, III, 
6, 430b6), or, even better, that it be intrinsically one, though divisible, since, as rightly 
observed by Alexander (Simplicius, In Phys. 570,6), “even the one”—understood as the 
single extremity that two parts would have in common if their extremities were merely ἅµα 
but not ἕν (according to the former of the two interpretations of this distinction presented 
above)—“is destroyed on account of being continuous”, namely when the parts come to 
coalesce in a single (continuous) item, or are there only potentially. The last sentence of 
Aristotle’s statement should, then, be intended to make clear that intrinsic unity, namely 
continuity, is not the same as original unity, since something could be made intrinsically one, 
and thus continuous (or a continuum), “by a bolt or glue or junction, or organic union”, that 
is, shortly speaking, by an appropriate coalescence. In other terms, what this passage would 
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argue for, would be that continuity can be generated or restored, which fits with what 
Aristotle says just above: “the continuum is in those things from which, by nature, some one 
is generated by contact”. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
As telling as they might be, neither this basic idea of continuity nor its implementation in 
conditions (1a*-c**), are clear-cut enough to unequivocally fix the property of being 
continuous (or a continuum) for an indisputable general use. None of them is, for example, 
able to make clear how an item should be in order to have no actual parts. 
Far from being a deceptive result of my analysis, this confirms the claim I made above: 
Aristotle was not taking continuity as a mathematical notion; his elucidating was not at all, for 
him, a way to contribute to mathematics; rather, he conceived it as a primitive and salient 
property of physical bodies and natural changes that, in agreement to Aristotle’s conception of 
the nature of µαθηµατικά exposed in Metaphysics M 1-3, can be extended to them, without, 
however, properly admitting a definition, a mere description of this property being enough. 
If my interpretation is correct, it explains in a quite satisfactory way, I think, the lack of 
any account of the connection between measure and continuity in V 3. Not only, was such a 
connection, which appears quite natural to us, not at all so for him, because of the absence of 
any notion similar to that of real number (which provides, of us, a bridge between them). 
More deeply, it were also not so, for him, since his conceptions of measure and continuity, so 
different than ours, made these two notions orthogonal to each other: while a measure of a 
quantity—a number or a magnitude—was, for him, an aliquot part of it, the continuity was, 
for him, dependent on the absence of actual parts. Hence, according to Aristotle’s view, one 
could have identified a measure of any continuous item counting as a magnitude, only by 
breaking its continuity36. 
                                                
36 What makes still possible, in light of this notion of continuity, for a magnitude, understood as a continuous 
quantity, to have measures has been explained in § 2, and there should be no need to return to it here. 
